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So here I am, in the middle way, having had twenty
yearsI we/fly years largely wasted. .. Trying to learn
to use words and every attempt is a wholly new start, and
a different kind offailure. Because one has only learnt to
get the better of words. For the thing one is no longer
disposed to say,or the way one is no longer disposed to
say it. And so each venture is a new beginning, a raid on
the inarticulate
T. S. Eliot1
Great disorder under heaven
The emergence of Basic Human Needs/Basic Needs!
Minimum Material Needs approaches to develop-
ment cannot be understood in isolation. It is part of
the intellectual history of the death of a paradigm.
That paradigm equated development with maximum
GDP growth and modernisation through maximum
investment. Growthmanship and gap closingin
their western capitalist, European socialist, and
related guises2saw the future of the periphery in
terms of the centre's past: history was to repeat itself
neither as tragedy nor farce but as triumph.
By 1960 that paradigm was under serious attack; by
1970 it was on the verge of dissolution. Disorder was
evident in the thought and action of most
intellectuals and decision talers concerned with
development. Frequent attempts were made either to
shore up the paradigm or to create a substitute
framework. A number of-syntheses and new "single
key element" approaches were floated with greater or
less plausibility, rigour, applicability and support. lt
is in this setting and terminological confusion that
Basic Human Needs (BHN) and its variants have
emerged. The operational antecedents to BHN
moreover have been national and the terminology is
therefore related to those national contexts. China
and Tanzania can hardly be expected to have
fashioned uniform international terminologies for
what are, in fact, national, political programmes.
Equally, the diversity arising from the emphasis on
worker and peasant perceptions and on indigenous
1 Possibly the quotation should he from 'Hamlet' or 'Tradition and the -
Individual Talent'tlse problems of achieving a valid relationship
between objective corretatives and concepts and of the two-way
interaction between a nesv contribution and the previous body of
thought are quite as real in development studies as in poetry.
Unfortunately they are less often, tess frequemitty, less explicitly and
less effectis ely faced.
2 e.g. tise Prehisch (Economic Commission for Latin America) and
Mahalanohis (Indian nlarxiari) schools of thought. l3oth are in part
original and centred in non-European contests but they accept
unexamined the basic elements of the paractigns.
intellectual formulations inevitably leads to a lack of
uniformity in basic needs terminology, even when the
discussion is restricted to a single country.3
While a definitive exposition is not yet possible, this
article attempts to sketch the main elements of a
thorough-going Basic Human Needs strategy, to give
a brief resume of the history of current BHN/BN
debates and to consider certain elements of unity and
diversity present in those debates.
Basic Human Needs: concept and strategy 1
As an organising concept for a development strategy,
Basic Human Needsas the name impliesis
concerned with the primary needs of communities
and individuals. lt rejects the sacrifice of a minimum
decent (socially determined) standard of life for
workers and peasants, either to provide the
'incentive' for capitalist accumulation or the means
to socialist reconstruction for the putative benefit of
rather vaguely identified future generations. In
rejecting the maximisation of the rate of growth of
productive forces, it also denies the primacy of
accumulation.
BHN as a strategy has five broad targets. It seeks to
provide:
bt'sic consumer goodsfood, clothing, housing,
basic furnishings and other socially defined
necessities (including, in Chtna, a decent burial);
--universal access to basic services, e.g. primary and
adult education, pure water, preventative and
curative health programmes, habitat (environmental
sanitation, urban and rural community infrastruc-
ture) and communications;
the right to productive employment (including
self-employment) yielding both high enough produc-
tivity and equitable enough remuneration to allow
each household to meet its basic personal
consumption out of its own income;
--an infrastructure capable of: producing the goods
and services required (whether directly via domestic
3 See, for exaniple, Towards a Sos-joust Sri La,ska (Centre for Society
and Religion 1977) and Sri Lanka: An E,vps'rienre in a Neid-
Oriented Development (Marga Institute/lnternational Fund for
Development Alternatives, 1978). In this case the terminology also
differs betsveen the two analyses of the sanie context apparently
independent of the difference in analysis und conclusion. (The first is
'revolutionary' and tite second 'progressive': see above).
4 TIsis section is largely a synthesis of tise conceptual frames of
Employment, Giant/s ansi Biss ir Needs (t LO, I 9781; I V/sat Psis iv?
Ano/lar Des'c'Iopnis'nl ( Dag Ha nsmarskiold Foundation 1975);
Report (5f the Eghans Meeting (World Councit of Churches Unit
Justice and Service. 1977). The aut hor is evidently nol. ncn-patlisafl
as he took part in each of tise three "source" groups.
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production or indirectly through foreign trade);
generating a surplus to finance basic communal
services; providing investment sufficient to sustain
the increases in productive forces needed to advance
towards the fulfilment of BHN;
mass participation in decision-taking and the
implementation of projects.
The BHN strategy envisaged here is production
orientedtransfer payments in the sense of
secondary redistribution of consumption power are
not central5. Its emphasis is on primary redistribu-
tionof income, assets, powerbecause it views the
separation of production and distribution as
theoretically unsound and practically impossible.
The need for productive employment is therefore
both an end and a means and accumulation, while
denied the status of an end, is seen as critical.
But BHN is not concerned with absolute poverty or
minimum needs alone. Its stress on the social
determination of needs implies that, as initial targets
are approached, new ones will succeed them, and in
this sense it is process-oriented. At least immediate
BHN goals, therefore, differ sharply from state to
state depending on historic, political, social and
economic circumstances. Meeting initial BHN
targets is infinitely more difficult technically, and a
fortiori politically, with high degrees of inequality. In
part however, the stress on equality depends on value
judgementsradical inequality of results (not just of
opportunity) is perceived as an evil.
Participation is a vital means to achieving these
goods as well as art end in itself. The strategy does not
propose marginal tinkering, but a form of liberation
much closer to revolutionnon-violent or otherwise.
Consensus and mutual interest models of the state
which deny class differences and the integral nature
of struggle are rejected: there is no way the strategy
can work without mass participation and control.
The BHN strategy taken as a whole is not
materialistic: priority emphasis on a number of the
basic goods and services mentioned are hard to
justify on market force or socialist production
grounds. Some (especially the material) components
of a BUN strategy can be listed as global, universal
needs: others are specific to time, community and
place.
Historical antecedents: intellectual and operationaL
While the concept of Basic Human Needs was not
invented by the consultants for the ILO's World
Employment Conference, that occasion was one of
5 The counter view (e.g. Srinivason, 1977) is a clear misreading. Not
simply the 13H1"t analysts but equally the 1976 World Employment
Conference Declaration (ILO, 1976) underscore raising productivity
and production in ways achieving primary redistribution.
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the first major forums at which it was discussed in its
present form and its preparationand especially the
writing of Employment, Growth and Basic Needs
(ILO, 1975)brought a number of strands together.
Like other concepts, it represents both a reordering
of existing elements and the introduction of newer
ones. The main influences behind the emergence of
explicit BHN and BN discussions in 1975 include:6
Indian work on basic and minimum needs during
the 1960s, including work by K. N. Raj and B.
Minhas. Much of this thinking was embodied in
early drafts of the 5th Plan, and in related South
Asian studies (for example, those of K. Griffin).
The attempt to articulate a socialist economic and
pricing calculus more relevant to a socialist society's
aims. This is associated with the work of Kalecki and
I. Sachs, and involved what Minhas has termed, in a
slightly different context, the rejection of the
Benthamite calculus (which is basically marginalist
economics turned into a general social model).
The "mass needs" debate (particularly in its
Mahgrebin-Egyptian forms), particularly the exami-
nation of the limits of socio-economic reconstruction
under Nasser and those imposed by the initial
(Betteiheim) heavy industry centred Algerian
strategy.
Certain Latin American thinking arising from the
limitations and failures as well as insights of ECLA's
"gapmanship" model (Cardoso). The disaggregation
of dependence models in order to study in detail their
impact on exploited and excluded groups (Staven-
hagen, Furtado) was also an important Latin
American element.
Interaction between the debate on the New
International Economic Order (NIEO) and that on
Self-Reliance. Especially relevant was the recognition
that changes at international trade levels were
meaningless without parallel national strategic
changes being made both on the periphery and by
stronger trade partners at the centre. Otherwise, the
excluded, exploited and oppressed in the periphery
would be unlikely to benefit from so-called gains
achieved within the framework of NEIO.
Reactions against the arguments in Limits to
Growth that world resource constraints required
continued inequality. Particularly important here
was the work of the Bariloche Foundation on a Latin
American model which sought to demonstrate the
feasibility of meeting basic material needs in a
reasonable time.
6 Concept dating is always difficult. What Vow? (Dag Haninsarskjold
Foundation, 1975) and Eiplo vinent, Growth and Basic Needs (ILO,
1976) are taken as the first formulalions of BHN/BN as a strategic
concept but some earlier works also h Ive claims to that status.
--The attempt by the United Nations Environmental
Programme (UNEP) (and particularly by Maurice
Strong) to develop an "inner limit" of minimum
human needs as a co-constraint with the ecological
"outer limit" in the development of environmental
policy.7
The World Bank's (and particularly Robert
McNamara's) growing concern from 1969 onwards
that the old development model excluded at least
40 per cent of the world's population from its
benefits. This concern had previously led to "absolute
poverty eradication" and "redistribution with
growth".
The international Labour Organisation's World
Employment Programme (ILO-WEP) and the
conversion of those most concerned from strategies
concerned with narrowly defined wage employment
to those stressing full productive employment.
A general revolt against intellectual over-
centralism: both a "revolt of the periphery" against
Eurocentric intellectual paradigms and a questioning
of the 'top down' analyses made by central decision
takers.
The experience of several nations which did pursue
strategies markedly unlike that of the dominant
paradigm: China and Tanzania (BHN); Taiwan,
South Korea (BN). Sri Lanka's BN approach was a
perplexing influence as it was basically non-
participatory, only tenuously linked to primary (as
opposed to secondary fiscal and subsidy) redistribu-
tion, and neither economically nor socially self-
sustaining.8
Of these influences, the last is probably the most
important. However, the IJNEP-IBRD-ILO strands
contributed much of the analysis leading up to the
current BHN debate. Three influences, often asserted
to have been critical, almost certainly were not;
indeed, they were rejected by a majority of those
involved at an early stage, These vvere:
the European conceived African and Asian
"community development" movement of the 1950-
60s, seen as offending both agai list freedom
(paternalism and Eurocentrism) and necessity
(inadequate attention to the basic need of poor
people to produce more).
--the social statistics movementincluding "social
cost/benefit" analysis -seen as economistic, always
in danger of "black boxing" experts' values as truth
and ignoring needs as perceived by workers and
7 What Noir? grew out of an initial tJ NEP request that the
Bainniarskjold Foundation rIo a global minimum needs study (See
also Mathess s 977).
8 cf sources cited at Note 4. This perplexity of perception is shared by
many Sri Lankan participa ntsa nil analysts (lt '1 N ¡ UN or otherwise).
peasants, and likely to serve as a substitute or excuse
for not acting in respect of visible needs. This can be
seen in part as a Third World revolt against Western
intellectual hegemony, and in part as a practitioner
reaction against arid formalism.
the most austere "alternative life-style", "zero
growth" forms of First World environmentalism, seen
as relating to totally different objective conditions
and as embodying values (e.g. austerity for its own
sake) the Third World did not share.
Elements of unity and diversity
The strategic model as outlined above is clearly not
accepted in full by all who support BN or BHN.
Sonic elements unify the disparate proponents of
BHN/BN, and some issues clearly divide them. The
death of the old paradigm haspredictably-----been
the occasion for a highly unstable situation in which
new concepts are very rapidly projected and often as
rapidly dropped. There persists a facile hope of
finding 'the answer' and an easy short terni one at
that. There have also been some 'mergers' with
strands of analysis and action previously isolated or
insulated from political economic strategic debate.
These include the bodies related to the International
Council of Adult Education, and Christjan bodies
concerned with distributive justice, particularly the
World Council of Churches.9 What effects or final
synthesis will emerge from these alliances is unclear.
A number of advocates appear to have seen BHN as
a convenient context in which to promote their own
long standing preoccupations. Many community
development advocates, some social statisticians,
some model builders, certain international agencies
(but not the ILO, UNEP or IBRD, whose involve-
menthowever evaluatedis both of longer
standing and more basic) and a bevy of
'developmentalists' and 'poverty specialists' ap-
pear to fall in this camp.
The perception of BN as a means of stabilizing and
reducing tensions in order to avert more basic change
(a group in which many would place the World Bank)
is very influential. Not unrelated are the aid agencies
who use BHN or BN to justify "Aid for the Poorest"
or similar proposals. BI-IN does not reject aid: in
principle, il sees it as recompense for continued
unequal transactions and structures. Like NIEO,
however, the BHN strategic formulation treats aid as
a transitional element.
There are also those who advocate policies and
strategies based on a new international economic
order, but one in which Basic Human Needs are
integrated.10 The objection here is that the internal
9 e.g. December 1976 issue of f'oni'ergenre; Green, 1977; Egliam
Report, WCC, 1977; Ecumenical Institute, 1976.
lo See e.g. Reshaping the Intei-national Order (RIO) (Tinbergen, 1976).
For a futter review see Green. 1977A.
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upheavalboth political and economicdemanded
by the implementation of BHN policies is restricted
to poor countries. Further, it is to be imposed by the
centre on the periphery rather than involving global
distributive justice. Given the centre's lack of
credibility as an advocate of implementing BHN-
either on the periphery or, in many cases, at home-
this recommendation has created suspicion, anger
and in some cases fear that BHN/BN has become a
rich country manoeuvre to prevent radical change on
the periphery.
There is doubtless a general concern with personal
consumption goods and basic services. However,
several groups of BN (and some BHN) advocates
would prefer to see this as one element in a differently
conceived strategy. For example, Minhas sees public
service programme packages as enabling the most
deprived groups to become productive enough to
attain minimum income standards.
A clear division exists on basic versus minimum
needs. The earlier advocates of absolute poverty
eradication and of a human environmental minimum,
e.g. IBRD and UNEP respectively, tend to stress
minimum, and often minimum material, needs. So do
certain aid agencies and some Third World
proponents who view meeting minimum require-
ments as so difficult that anything further is
diversionary.
Another split is that between Basic Human Needs
and Basic Needs: this is not merely a quibble over
words. The BN formulations do not make
participation integral; indeed, they have a distinct
tendency to erect Platonic Guardians (states, leaders,
the IBRD, the revolutionary vanguard). Nor do they
lay much stress on productive employment as a
means of creating a production relations and power
base to sustain the strategy. The BHN advocates,
however, see participation and productive employ-
ment as vital means as well as integral ends.
While there is agreement in rejecting much of the
statistical apparatus and ideology built around the
old paradigm, there is total disarray on what is
needed for BHN or BN. At one extreme are the
proponents of an equally abstract, universalised set
of prescriptive needs at global level with highly
subjective measures of their fulfilment. At the other
are those who note that countries in which BN or
BHN strategies are at least partially operativee.g.
China, Tanzania, Somalia, Vietnam, Mozambique
are not very prone to statistical sophistication. They
have elaborated their statistical requirements in the
course of implementation, not as a precondition to
determining needs or setting strategic targets. From
this record one conclusion is that "poverty mapping"
is in practice an alternative to, not a means toward,
either BHN or BN, just as in the 1950s and 1960s
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much Plan writing was an alternative to creating a
serious planning process. Almost all intermediate
positions also have their advocates. In general, Third
World and decision-taking participants in the
dialogue tend toward the "act first and find out data
needs as we go along" approach: First World,
academic, and international agency participants
prefer detailed prior mapping.
Another split is on whether BHN/BN is relevant to
global inequality and to 'rich' countiy development.
Clearly the logic of a BHN strategy at global level-
while not centering on "gapmanship"does imply
ceilings on inequality among countries in the use of
scarce resources. This implication is rarely articulated
presumably for tactical reasons. 13N has much
weaker implications on this front: it can hardly he
seen as a strategic organising concept for rich
countries as BHN can be. However, BHN
articulation for states with high levels of productive
forces is virtually non-existent: while some formula-
tions may see Sweden as a high income state with a
quasi-BHN approach this is neither spelled out nor
shared by most participants.
At the moment those who assert their advocacy of
BHN and/or BN span a very wide gamut of
classifications on either political, economic, ideo-
logical, or analytical criteria. Presumably this will not
endure. However, to date three groupsconserva-
tive, progressive/radical and revolutionaryhave
emerged.
Conservative (or capitalist) advocates and analysts
are usually Basic or Minimum Needs proponents. On
the whole they do not see participation as an end (as
opposed to a means or manipulative device) nor do
they interpret full productive employment in terms of
power or production relations. Equally, their
allocation analyses rarely see strategy alterations as
releasing or mobilising a significant volume of
previously unusable resources.
The most extreme of this group can be termed
Friedmanite--after all Friedman's minimum income
and negative income tax arguments are minimum
material needs ones, and he believes that laissez faire
plus minimum income guarantees are most beneficial
to the poor. The 1976 Turner Report on incomes
policy in Tanzania (not very representative of
general ILO positions) and some World Bank
country reports (not necessarily represeatative) can be
seen in this context.
Basic (or minimum) needs models based, whether
implicitly or explicitly, on Taiwan and South Korea,
represent a more mainstream conservative BN
variant. The WEP's (pre BHN) Philippine Employ-
ment Mission Report is an example as, in many
respects, are President McNamara's 1969-77 Annual
Bank Board of Governor's Speeches. So too, in
practice, are most aid agency BN programmes
(Sweden, Norway and probably the Netherlands are
exceptions which fall into the next group).
Progressive/radical (social democratic) analyses
normally include participation and the political!
power aspects of productive employment. Exceptions
are the strategic component (as opposed to strategy)
BN packages which are usually related to strategies in
one way or another encompassing these elements, as
in the draft Indian Fifth Plan. The Christian
component also falls largely into this group, at least
as far as reports or institutionally published papers
are concerned (e.g. World Council of Churches, 1977;
Riddell, 1977).
Mainstream ILO workespecially the WEP report,
Meeting Basic Needsis squarely in this group. It too
shows signs of toning down more radical or
revolutionary contributions, but the trend here
appears to be toward the progressive/conservative
frontier not the radical/revolutionary one.
The revolutionary (transition to socialism) analysts
and advocates are often difficult to distinguish from
the radical end of the progressive/radical grouping.
This arises from a desire to relate to broader groups
of decision takers than would accept a transition to
socialism approach, or to a wider range of contexts
than those in which a revolutionary strategy is
attainable, and also from the fact that a BHN
strategy is usually perceived as less directly linked to
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